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A
LITERARY
LIARS I HAVE
KNOWN:
The Need for
Scepticism
About the
Printed Page
Thomas M. Curley

Sir Robert Chambers

a student of life and letters, I
have met my share of literary
liars. I don't like liars, I do like
the truth, and I do know how demanding the truth is to discover. A bright
freshman told me that knowing the
truth is impossible, that all he knows
is what he knows, and to hell with any
kind of objective certitude or verifiable
probability. Although such thinking is
fashionable today, especially among intellectuals, I think that freshman is
wrong and that such intellectuals are
cowardly victims of a confused war-weary
century that too easily abandoned the
truth of objective reality. To repeat, I
think the truth can be known and is
worth knowing, although it will always
be difficult to grasp.

My experience in writing a biography of a forgotten figure in eighteenthcentury English law and literature is a
good example of the difficulty of confronting the truth about human life.
In this case the human life concerns
the career of a great man of law, Sir
Robert Chambers, born 1737 and died
1803, who was the close friend of the
foremost personality in English literature, Samuel Johnson. Chambers is
himself important as a brilliant historian of the British constitution, who,
with Johnson's secret help, wrote a
memorable lecture survey of English
law as Vinerian Professor of Oxford
University. Chambers is even more
important as the cosmopolitan Bengal
judge who founded the body of law on
which the Republic of India subsists today. My biographical research about
Chambers in England and India for seventeen years showed me dramatically the
need for scepticism about the printed
page, about the dangers of relying on
secondary sources and hearsay evidence,
and the necessity of intensive literary
detective work to uncover the truth
about Chambers . Only the primary
sources of his letters and papers allowed
me to grasp fully his complex public and
private life.
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The truth of Sir Robert Chambers
turned out to be knowable, but only
after I overcame many false starts into
scholarly bypaths of false reporting and
recovered the thread of a verifiable reality by means of the documentary evidgnce of his own writings. Probably the
worst enemy in my biographical quest
was a literary liar whose name I want
to live in infamy. He is William Hickey,
a cocky lawyer who argued before the
Supreme Court of India when Sir Robert Chambers was its second Chief Justice from 1784 to 1798 at Calcutta. Afterwards, around 1815, Hickey wrote
a racy autobiography that made a sensation in his time and supposedly remains a mother-lode of information
about Chambers as an Indian judge.
The book is The Memoirs of William
Hickey, and it has been hailed as "one
of the most remarkable books of its
kind ever published in the English language." In fact, it is remarkable only
as a pack of lies about Chambers. However, I did not know this for many
years. Here is the story of my discovery of the consummate literary liar,
William Hickey, mendacious memoirist of Sir Robert Chambers.
Gail Caldwell, book reviewer for The
Boston Globe who was alarmed last
year by the cut-and-paste smear of Ted
Kennedy in Joe McGinniss's The Last
Brother of 1993, posed a disturbing
question: "When did we start thinking
that the truth no longer mattered?"
She then answered her own question
and took a short view of the
longstanding problem of literary lying.
She was aghast at the current fashion
of "virtual biography," in which authors write about individuals from
their own imaginings and intuitions
and go so far as to invent dialogue and
insights by invading the inner recesses
and most secret feelings of impenetrable hearts dwelling in long-dead
personages. Caldwell finds that such
groundless but self-centered authorial
interpretation has become increasingly
acceptable to modern readers of biog-

raphy. Fudge is as good as fact for audiences hungry for Hard Copy sensationalism (see Oliver Stone'sNaturalBorn Killers) and weaned on Oprah
Winfrey tell-all talkshows. This is a
public so satiated with lying as to have
lost faith or hope in truthfulness (see
Robert Redford's Quiz Show).
It is not laypeople alone who have a
stomach for "virtual biography." A respected New Yorker critic recently categorized three golden ages of biography: first, Samuel Johnson's brilliantly
written, sensitive, if unscholarly, portraits; second, researched scholarly
tomes of psychological and stylistic
distinction by the likes of Richard
Ellman and Leon Edel; and lastly, subjective "literary entertainment" by current biographers like Victoria
Glendinning, Peter Ackroyd, and Richard Holmes. Readers may choose what
pleases them most, but I take my stand
with the first and second categories and
reserve my "literary entertainments"
for my reading of novels which don't
pretend to be historical accounts.
Caldwell traces the modern misplaced love of "virtual biography" to
our collective disillusionments with
Kennedy 's Camelot, Vietnam, Nixon,
and the rise of Hunter Thompson "New
Journalism" or Truman Capote-like
"Nonfiction Novels." However, the origins of literary lying reach farther back
than these phenomena. They are as old
as humanity itself, a humanity fated to
live in the real world but perennially
prone to self-love, vulnerable to selfdeception, and primed for a self-centered tampering with the truth. The
William Hickeys of the past exist in the
present and will populate the future.
Jonathan Swift in his brilliantly hilarious Tale of a Tub in 1704 had already
seen literary deception and selfcenteredness as unhappy consequences
of an unclassical modern culture preoccupied with mass communication. Swift
has a crack-brained modern author crow
about the mighty literary feats that the

present age is accomplishing through
sheer self-absorption devoid of traditional learning and productive of empty
originality and vapid newness. 'We of this
Age have discovered a shorter, and more
prudent Method, to become Scholars and
Wits, without the Fatigue of Reading or
of Thinking . . . . I am now trying an Experiment very frequent among modern
Authors; which is, to write upon Nothing. When [that] Subject is utterly exhausted, to let the Pen still move on ...
by the Ghost of Wit." Anticipating the
subjective excesses of current literary
criticism and biography, Swift's stupid
author sums up the philosophy of modernity in a syllogism: "Words are but
Wind; and Learning is nothing but
Words; Ergo, Learning is Nothing but
Wind."
Swift's century was notable for literary charlatans, authors like James
"Ossian " Macpherson and Thomas
"Rowley" Chatterton, who preferred
wind to solidity. These are well-known
frauds . But there is another eighteenth-century liar whom I am exposing for the first time in this essay. This
is William Hickey, a man whose life and
lying Memoirs intersected with
Chambers's illustrious career and with
my early biographical research about
Sir Robert's judgeship. Hickey 's nasty
account almost stopped me years ago
from wanting to compose the first fulldress biography of Chambers. I was
only to learn much later, after a most
painstaking struggle with a mountain
of forgotten primary sources, how
much lying was perpetrated in The

Memoirs of William Hickey.
Initially, very little was known about
Chambers. Except for a very "Brief
Memoir" by Lady Chambers in 1838
and his posthumous Treatise on Estates and Tenures of 1824, virtually no
published materials about him exist.
Not even occasional references in
Boswell's famous Life of Johnson of
1791 and in Johnson's own letters
could rescue Chambers from almost
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total neglect. Fortunately, my trips to
England and India brought to light a
considerable cache of new primary
sources. What turned up at libraries in
Londor:i, Oxford, and Calcutta was well
over a hundred letters by or to Chambers as well as a wealth of documents
pertaining to his career in India. But
where, as Johnson demanded of biographers, was I to uncover the "invisible circumstances " of my subject's
private life? With the help of the late J.
D. Fleeman at Pembroke College and
the late Sir Rupert Cross, twelfth
Vinerian Professor of English Law at
Oxford, I met Chambers's descendants
in England and , through them , obtained access to private letters, a manuscript history of the family, and a longlost Reynolds portrait of Chambers.
There was often the need for persistence with my hosts, who, although
revering their forebear, regarded their
memorabilia as hindrances to my enjoyment of their hospitality. One aging spinster, shocked that her visitor
was not as elderly as she was, thought
it her duty to invent ways of entertaining me to save me from the boredom
of rummaging through heirlooms.
Whole days this lady insisted that we
spend in bird-watching along the Norfolk coast, and whole nights, after she
retired to bed, I devoted to transcribing antique papers.
Upon my return from a second sojourn in England, I learned that another treasure-trove of primary
sources survived halfway around the
world. The Victoria Memorial Hall at
Calcutta preserved seventy-two volumes of unstudied judicial notebooks
which comprise the only daily history
of the founding of the Supreme Court
of India, where Chambers initiated a
still flourishing legacy of Anglo-Indian
law. Winning access to these notebooks, however, required five years of
intricate negotiation with the government of India, a security check by our
State Department to see if I was a spy,
and a congressman's intervention for

microfilms of a large portion of the
notebooks. Even worse, during my first
visit to India, the curator of the library
where they were stored refused to
make them available to me, because my
earlier purchase of microfilmed notebooks had subjected me to an investigation in the Parliament of India for
allegedly bribing an Indian librarian to
get the materials. Miffed by the
curator's parting advice to come back
again some day to Calcutta, I eventually
received official permission and transcribed notebooks on the premises in
humid 100-degree temperatures, with
the assistance of the eminent Professor
Donald J. Greene, in the summer of 1986.
Such was the happy ending to a decade
of biographical research in search of primary sources by Sir Robert Chambers,
with which to counter untrustworthy
secondary sources, like the Memoirs of
William Hickey.
Taken together, the evidence disclosed that Chambers was a literary as
well as a legal man, developing into a
sophisticated historian of the British
constitution as second Vinerian Professor at Oxford, participating importantly in Johnson 's literary life and Literary Club at London, forwarding Sir
William Jones 's oriental scholarship as
president of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and as possessor of the largest private library of Sanskrit manuscripts in
the century, and, most noteworthy of
all, planting an enduring hybrid heritage of Anglo-Indian political justice in
the Supreme Court of India. As my
subject's intricate reality came into focus, I completed in 1986 a two-volume
edition of his A Course of Lectures on
the English Law for the University of
Wisconsin Press and Clarendon Press.
Written with Johnson's secret assistance
from 1767 to 1770, this brilliant lecture
series for Chambers's Vinerian Professorship proved an intellectual watershed for
the legal-political thought of both remarkable men.

The full story of his exciting career
is told in my forthcoming biography,
Sir Robert Chambers: Law, Literature,
and Empire in the Age ofJohnson. But
let me state here that his conduct on
the Bengal bench, like his performance
in the Vinerian Chair, displayed both a
devotion to English legal tradition and
an openness to cultural diversity that
enabled him to transcend British
prejudices, promote Asian studies, accommodate English justice to native
usages, and leave behind a rich fabric
of Anglo-Indian jurisprudence. Indeed,

William Hickey
in perhaps the century's worst miscarriage of justice, the execution of Maharajah Nuncomar for forgery, Chambers
alone of the four Supreme Court justices called for a flexible interpretation
of English criminal statutes to stop a
cruel death penalty unknown to native
systems of law. To the later disgrace of
the Court, his dissent went unheeded
and has remained ignored by all previous historians of British India.
Unfortunately, his exemplary record
of judicial service has lain under a
cloud of recrimination and ridicule
stirred up by The Memoirs of William
Hickey. Published in two separate editions in 1925 and 1962, the manuscript
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of this dishonest work, in 762 closely
written folio sheets, is preserved in the
Oriental and India Office Collections of
the British Library. The lively, highly
readable text has duped many a modern scholar into accepting it as gospel
truth about daily life in late eighteenthcentury British India. Why would it not
deceive the unwary? Sounding
throughout like a truth-teller, Hickey
misled his audience from the outset,
on the first page, where he boasted his
accuracy and yet pretended to describe
even minutely detailed episodes, replete
with extended dialogue, largely from
unassisted memory! "True it is," Hickey
asserted, "I had few documents to guide
me, ... yet . . . I can safely aver, there is
not a single fact recorded in the following sheets, that is not, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, most truly
and correctly stated." Chambers was
unlucky in his association with a frustrated novelist like Hickey, but he was
nonetheless lucky to have left a powerful antidote for Hickey's lies in the form
of judicial notebooks, letters, and
Calcutta newspapers which provide
unassailable evidence of his invaluable
labors in the Supreme Court of India.
Born in 1749, Hickey landed at
Calcutta in 1777 to set up as an attorney through Chambers 's patronage.
Generous to a fault, Sir Robert extended his support and friendship , until the new arrival made himself disagreeable by his hard-drinking brashness and allied himself with the judge's
political enemies. Hickey even carried
back to the Parliament of England a
public petition protesting the Supreme
Court of India. Whatever the precise
causes for the disaffection between the
two men, it was Chambers who bore
the brunt of the ill-will showered on
the Supreme Court in the Memoirs of
William Hickey. Its portrait of Sir Robert is a caricature of a colossally weak
human being, whose alleged "natural
frivolity and want of firmness " in the
Nuncomar Case made him seem a

decidedly lousy judge, not worth memorializing in any biography. According to the Memoirs, Chambers opposed
the guilty verdict but weakly acceded to
the execution of Nuncomar, when in fact
Chambers accepted the guilty verdict but
actively opposed the execution.
Other errors surface with enough
frequency to contribute to a cumulative impression of careless narration
and maliciously baseless accusations
against Chambers. Hickey reported, for
example, that on 14 January 1784 Sir
Robert first officiated as Chief Justice
and showed "mistaken delicacy" in advising an Indian, who confessed to a
murder, to avail himself of a full-blown
trial. Supposedly the prisoner reluctantly followed the advice, only to receive the death penalty and comment
wryly in the end, "You insisted upon
my telling a lie, and have chosen to give
yourselves (looking round the Court) a
great deal of unnecessary trouble." Aside
from the improbable precision of the recollected conversation, the problem with
the allegation is that Chambers was hundreds of miles away from the Supreme
Court at the time!
The half-truths and flawed anecdotes
about Chambers might not have added
up to anything substantially damaging,
had Hickey not dared to impugn his
victim's very integrity as a judge. Chambers supposedly succumbed to bias on
behalf of governmental tyranny in the
face of militant opposition from his liberty-loving colleague, Justice William
Jones. The actual proceedings were far
different. Any bias existed in the mind of
Hickey, a trouble-making participant in
a brawl. He painted the incident as the
black-and-white affair of victimized citizens versus brutal peace officers infringing on the most basic rights of Englishmen by means of tyrannical general warrants. When the outraged citizens sued
the peace officers in retaliation, Chambers, the senior judge, went to supposedly unprofessional lengths to protect his
police staff. Hickey then claimed that

Jones delivered against Chambers a defiant dissenting opinion registering his
outraged sense of justice. In it Jones considered the peace officers worthy of "the
highest degree of reprobation" and hence
liable to pay the plaintiffs the largest
damages allowable by law.
To turn from Hickey's colorful recital
to Chambers's painstaking notes of the
trial is to discover where the biased viewpoint really resides. Owing to the
citizens's abusive treatment of the peace
officers during the brawl, Sir Robert had
legitimate grounds for upholding police
powers. Furthermore, Justice Jones
never demanded harsh punishment for
the peace officers and never was offensive to Chambers in his dissent. On the
contrary, Chambers's judicial notebooks
attest to the reality of a congenial bench.
"I came into Court this day to give
J[udgemen]t in Griffin v. Deatker on
which Mr: Just: Jones differs with me on
one material point. ... Sir Wm. Jones
thinks there ought to be Jud[gemen]t for
Pl[aintiff] but that Dam[age]s ought to
be small."
The crucial document corroborating
Jones's deferential demeanor is his own
letter sent to Chambers four days before
the day of judgement. "No law justifies
the act [of arresting the plaintiffs]: but I
think the damages should not be large,
and, after this decision, we should hear
no more of the business .... I will listen
however attentively to your reasons, before judgement [is] given. I, in the mean
while, am dear Sir Robert, most affectly.
yours W. Jones." If Jones's letter and
Chambers's notes cannot suffice to discredit Hickey's account, then there is the
neutral testimony of the Calcutta Gazette and the India Gazette. These newspapers also documentJones's courteous
dissent: "He lamented that as the Junior
Judge he was first to deliver his sentiments, as it deprived him of an opportunity of altering them from the argument
he might [hear] from Sir Robert Chambers." They also confirm Jones's recommendation of "small" - not heavy -
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damages for the peace officers. Finally,
Hickey's dismissal of Chambers's closing statement as an "incoherent rhapsody on the case" wrongs a speech reported to be a model of common sense.
It is a maxim of English law that a
man is innocent until he is proven guilty.
Hickey produced no proof of Chambers's
incompetence. Instead, Hickey perpetrated massive literary perjury under a
false oath of truthfulness at the beginning of his narrative. Readers should
acquit Chambers of Hickey's baseless
charges and instead convict Hickey of aggravated fraud and felonious assault and
battery against a good judge's reputation.
Henceforth, let The Memoirs of William
Hickey meet with the fate that it deserves. Let the work suffer the just punishment of perpetual confinement in the
literary category of fantasy and fairy tale.
And let this mother of literary liars alert
us all to the dire need for scepticism
about the printed page, ancient or modern. Let us always seek the truth, and
nothing but the truth, by reference to
verifiable data, as opposed to subjective
conjecture ungrounded in hard and cold
fact. Such discerning skepticism, leavened by the buoyant sense that life has
meaning to be discovered through perseverance and intellectual courage,
seems a healthy recipe for personal happiness and social progress. After all,
Samuel Johnson, who loved Chambers
and had faith in his abilities, demanded
the truth from human beings in general
and from biographers in particular: "If
we owe regard to the memory of the dead,
there is yet more respect to be paid to
knowledge, to virtue, and to truth."
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